Mr. Ester-line briefed the group on the current situation in Cuba with the report that an alert has been sounded to initiate Phase One of the unified evacuation plan in. Cuba. He added that this group would be working largely together in operational programming and planning, ...

Ya en el mes de octubre pr6ximo paaado la aituacidn de hostilidad a Cjiba y de preparativ6s de la invaai6n en Guatemala eran evidentes. A mediadoa dedicho mes de octubre aument6 notablemente la activi-dad en las basea exiatentes en el 'Departaniento de etalhuleu. hi nu-mero de aviofres que llegaran y deacargaron fue mayor que de'ordina-rio, . Peraonas que txabajan an esoa centros senalaron que todo hacita penaar en la proximidad de una agreaidn a Cuba Iios avionea.habian...

In 1959, the yanki Department of State made the Dominican Republic its main mercenary training center. Adventurers and murderers from different countries, Falangists from the Blue Legion, Nazis, Japanese, yankis, war criminals, European renegades and other riffraff, assembled there and trained under the direction of PEDRAZA and Trujillo's Officers for an invasion of Cuba. Every day, the Dominican radio spewed insults and defamation against the Cuban Revolution and its leaders.

There is. it seem to me, a plausible argument for this decision if one excludes everything but Cuba Itself and looks only at the pace of military consolidation within Cuba and the mounting impatience of the armed exiles.

The great mass of Cuban people believe that the hour of decision la At hand and that the surrival of the CASTRO regime is in balance. They expect an Invasion to take place before mid-April 2961 and place great reliance In it.

En estos momentos es ya la 1 a.m. y todavia siento el cafioneo de ustedes. Pienso que les pueda tomar por lo menos dos o tres horas en tomar y limpiar Playa Larga y Buenaventura. En ese caso no quedana tiempo de avanzar de noche sobre Giron. En estas circunstancias de acuerdo con la situation ustedes pueden decidir posicionarse bien en esa zona de la costa, desde Buenaventura y La Maquina, comprendiendo a Playa Larga, concentrar las fuerzas e instalar todas las antiaerea...

I am finding a solution to the gun park thing. The other tanks will reach the Australia mill at dawn. Sometime during the day we will decide tfi.e best time to move them.

Lieutenant ermes [ferta] wiij give you a detailed explanation of the columns mission. You must leave a soon as ermes arrives, head along the aame route that battalion 111 took, go as far as battalion 111 has gone; from there you will set out to block the road which goes fram cayo ramona to girdn and lay in ambush along that road to prevent the enemy positioned in san bias from being able to withdraw towards giron, which is where the res.t of their troops are.

Mr. Dulles, in hia opening remarks, cited the document which authorized CIA. to conduct paramilitary operations. This document, NSC 5412, -was described as one of the moat secret documents in the U. S. Government. Mr, Dulles said that under this authority CIA. in directed to engage in activities nuch as the Cuban operation under the general supervision of the National Security Council. ...

In the conversation with E. Guevara, [I] inquired about his point of view regarding the situation, which recently developed in Cuba, and also about his assessment of Kennedy's recent statements regarding the U.S. policy toward the revolutionary government of Cuba. In response, Guevara said that the situation remained quite tense, although he personally believes that the danger of invasion of the country by large beachheads of the external counterrevolutionary forces has ...

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2. The defeat o the April 17 invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles can already be seen in retrospect as a decisive point-of-no-return for the Castro regime, and perhaps also for the Cuban people. This misadventure substantiated the Government's warnings against imperialist aggression from the United States; the ardent patriotism -which it excited enabled the Castro regime to suppress all internal opposition, to step up the pace of its socialist revolution and to sanctif...

The conversation took place the evening of August 17 at 2 A.M. Several members of the Brazilian and Argentine delegations had made efforts ? throughout the Punta del Este Conferencelto arrange a meeting between me and Che. This was obviously done with Che's approval, if not his urging, I had avoided such a meeting during the Conference. On Thursday we arrived in Montevideo and I was invited to a birthday party for the local Brazilian delegate to the Free Trade area.; Aft...

In evaluating the Agency's performance it is essential to avoid grasping immediately, as many persons have done, at the explanation that the Presidents order cancelling the D-Day air strikes was the chief cause of failure.

I believe thai Ihe concept of a command operation for Cuba, as discussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

Present: The President, General Taylor, the Attorney General, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric. General Lemnitzer, Mr. McCone, Alexie Johnnon, myself. At the White House, 1600 houra, 16 March 1962.

On this trip, Donovan reached a firm agreement with Castro for release of the 22 remaining Americans on April 22. The 4 Cubans are to be released at Key West the following day, April 23. This agreement was reached at a night-long conference beginning at 2:15 and ending at 6:30, Sunday morning. Details of the release followed a long discussion of the possibility of better American-Cuban relations as evidenced by recent Life, Look and Nation articles.

He appeared to have a very real acorn for regular military forces and what he refers to as the military mind.? He said that he had a strong faith In the outcome of the revolution from the time he was sore that the government would continue?to use only regular military forces against him. He said that their methods and moves were usually predictable and It was characteristic of them that If a plan had to be abandoned, they were totally lost. He made frequent references to...

If the President feels it necessary during the campaign to rnaice bellicose statements about Cuba or even to talce some hostile action -- IT he will inform me unofficially that a specific action is required because of domestic political considerations, X ahall understand and not take any serious 'retaliatory action, ...

Against the background of the post-Special Group Meeting which you held in the afternoon on 5 November 1963, I thought you would be interested in the following report which we have just received:...